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1.    INTRODUCTION
There is abundant scientific literature about the effect that politics in des-
tination countries have on immigration flows (Tienda, 2002), as well as about
the effect of political and humanitarian crises (wars, famines, etc.) on the
probability of migrating (Castles and Miller, 1993). However, there is little
research that links emigration flows with elections and other democratic polit-
ical events at the origin. One of the few studies that provide numerical evi-
dence on how immigration flows vary by election years in the country of ori-
gin suggests that, in Nicaragua, either emigration flows towards Costa Rica
diminish, or return migration increases, or both. According to a study based
on good quality vital statistics in Costa Rica, the typically sharp increase in
births by Nicaraguan migrant mothers is stopped or even reversed during the
year before elections in Nicaragua and during the electoral year (Brenes-
Camacho, 1999). How can elections have an impact on the decision to
migrate to another country? Can democratic electoral processes in countries
of origin have such an appeal for migrants as to motivate them or discourage
them to return home?
Given the democratization processes experienced by Latin American
countries during the 1980s and 1990s, studying such patterns is important
because they might mean that uncontrolled migration flows can be managed
or redirected faster than expected by promoting democratic activities and by
helping governments from developing countries to fulfill the expectations of
their electorates.
This article intends to show how political cycles are important in
describing temporal patterns in emigration and return migration flows among
Latin American migrants. Its goal is to explore the interrelationship between
electoral variables and migrants’ economic expectations.
2.   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A possible link between the electoral political cycle and migration deci-
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sions is based on one of the basic concepts of neo-classical economics: expec-
tations. According to classical economic theory, migration occurs when there
are geographic differentials in wages and employment levels, due to differen-
tials in demand and supply of the workforce (Massey et al., 1993, 1994; Harris
and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1976; Todaro y Maruszko, 1987) Assuming that
individuals are economically rational agents, they perform a cost-benefit
analysis when deciding whether to migrate or not. If the potential benefit is
greater than the cost, agents migrate. Potential benefit is based on the expecta-
tions of finding a job and on the expected income in the country of destination,
rather than on the full security of finding a job. As Massey et al. (1993: 701)
explain, “Expected income is defined as the probability of employment (one
minus the unemployment rate) times the mean income in whatever economic
sector a rational actor contemplates working […] The difference between
incomes expected at origin and destination, when summed and discounted
over some time horizon and added to the negative costs of movement, yields
the expected net gain from movement, which if positive promotes migration”.
Even though it is very likely that income expectations in countries of ori-
gin and destination might have an impact on migration flows, operationalizing
expected income as a function of unemployment rates at origin and destination
might yield a limited specification. Expected income is not determined by
labor income only. It may also be determined by welfare policies, such as sub-
sidies, public employment or public transfers. There is empirical evidence that
shows that migration is sensitive to those policies. In the United States of
America (U.S.), government subsidies for low socio-economic status (SES)
groups at origin or destination might decelerate, halt or redirect emigration
rates. De Jong, Graefe and St. Pierre (2005) report that poor families in the
U.S. have a greater probability of migrating towards states where it is easier to
qualify for public subsidies. Stecklov et al. (2005) show that the PROGRESA
program subsidies in Mexico diminish the probabilities that Mexicans have of
migrating towards the U.S. 
Indicators of macroeconomic performance - such as the unemployment
rate mentioned above - and the establishment of targeted welfare policies may
be correlated with the temporal proximity to an election. From a broad per-
spective, an electoral cycle refers to “…the relative timing of elections”
(Shugart, 1995: 328). In political sciences, an electoral cycle may refer to
changes in voters’ political alignment over time (Beck, 1979). An “electoral
cycle” can also refer to changes in social and economic variables that are cor-
related to the timing of elections. This covariation is the so-called political
business cycle. There are several theoretical models that explain the relation-
ship (Drazen, 2000). Some theories propose that voters respond rationally to
the political parties’ economic agendas, while other theories argue that public
officials develop expansive economic policies in order to recover the voter’s
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favor. Alesina’s rational partisan model (Alesina, 1987; Drazen, 2000)
assumes that voters react to “surprise” expected inflation, which is determined
by the policies of the political parties in contention (right-wing and left-wing).
The opportunistic model assumes that policy makers control macroeconomic
monetary instruments inducing low price increase or higher economic output
before election and higher inflation and lower economic output after the elec-
tion (Drazen, 2000). Such a cycle will increase voting for the incumbent.
Regardless of the actual mechanism, there is empirical evidence that shows a
political economic cycle in several countries, particularly in developing coun-
tries (Ames, 1987; Block, 2002; Gonzalez, 2002; Persson and Tabellini, 2003;
Schuknecht, 1996). Such a business cycle may then arise from direct or indi-
rect manipulation of economic incentives, as well as through welfare policies
(public employment, public transfers, etc.). Schuknecht (1996) argues that, in
developing countries, welfare policies may be more effective in determining
voters’ preferences than general macroeconomic performance. 
Migration behavior may follow the political business cycle if migration
flows are sensitive to the macroeconomic performance behind such a cycle.
If economic policies implemented near an election are aimed at improving
workers’ income, controlling inflation, or expanding welfare benefits, then
classical and neoclassical economics predict that the likelihood of migrating
would decrease. 
Nevertheless, neoclassical theory on migration has been criticized by sev-
eral authors (a critical revision of several migration theories can be found in
Massey et al., 1993, 1994). The main arguments against neoclassical theory are:
1) that research that has tried to prove these theoretical premises have not suc-
ceeded in operationalizing the concepts of expected income and cost, or that after
being operationalized, the results obtained are not the ones predicted by the the-
ory; 2) that the theory does not successfully explain why migration flows keep
happening despite unfavorable macroeconomic conditions in destination coun-
tries or favorable economic conditions at origin; 3) and that the theory does not
fully explain how the interaction between the real or potential migrant and his
social environment (family, community, social support networks at destination)
might produce barriers or incentives to migrate (Massey et al., 1993, 1994).
An electoral cycle in migration flows might also be determined by other
political and social factors, rather than by current characteristics of labor mar-
kets or welfare policies. Regarding political factors, mobilizations due to polit-
ical violence - which produce refugee flows - are the most evident, but there
are other more subtle political factors that might affect migration processes.
According to Lam (2002), lack of political confidence was more important
than lack of economic confidence in explaining emigration intentions by Hong
Kong inhabitants after the transition from British to Chinese rule. Cinel (1991)
considers that the Italian unification process promoted not only a reduction in
emigration rates, but also an increase in returning migrant flows during the
period 1870-1929. Besides, democratization processes and peace accords after
war conflicts have reduced emigration and induced return migration to Central
America, South America, the Middle East and Eastern Europe (Lundquist and
Massey, 2005; Klinthäll, 2007; Lubbad, 2007; Villa and Martínez-Pizarro,
2001). This latter evidence suggests that migration flows may follow an elec-
toral cycle that is not necessarily driven by the political business cycle. 
It is evident that there is scientific literature that links political events with
migration decisions, but we did not find any article that relates electoral
processes with migration decisions using individual data. The aim of this study
is to explore this relationship in several Latin American countries. The article
starts testing the statistical relationship between the timing of elections and the
likelihood of out-migration and return migration. The article then tests whether
this relationship is due to the political business cycle by statistically control-
ling for the confounding effect of macroeconomic variables. 
3.   OBJECTIVES
The main goal of this article is to determine whether there is an electoral
cycle in emigration and return migration among Latin American migrants. In
this article, an electoral cycle in migration flows means that the likelihood to
emigrate and to return to the home country is different during an election year,
the year before, and the year after, compared to during other years at origin
countries. This effect is studied with migrants from Mexico, Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Peru, and Guatemala. Most of the flows refer
to migration to the U.S except in Peru, where other destination countries are
also included. Additionally, the article also analyzes Nicaraguans that migrate
to Costa Rica. It also studies whether these electoral cycles might be explained
by political business cycles that run parallel to electoral cycles.
4.   DATA AND METHODS
4.1   The MMP and LAMP projects
The Mexican Migration Project (MMP) and the Latin American
Migration Project (LAMP) contain useful information to analyze migration
processes from the region towards the United States. Some of the country-
specific studies have information about South-South migration (Nicaragua to
Costa Rica, Peru to Argentina). This article uses a combination of different
datasets that are comparable with each other. These research projects have
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been conducted by Princeton University (U.S.), in collaboration with the
University of Guadalajara, as well as with other research centers in Latin
America. The projects have been funded by grants from the U.S.A. National
Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD), and the Mellon
Foundation (MMP, 2004; LAMP, 2004). The datasets to be used are known as:
MMP118, LAMP-DR7, LAMP-CR7, LAMP-GUAT3, and LAMP-NIC9. Data
were collected using the “ethno-survey” technique (Massey et al, 1987)
applied in several communities in Mexico, Dominican Republic, Guatemala,
Peru, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. LAMP also includes datasets from El
Salvador and Paraguay, but their usefulness for the analysis is limited due to
differences in the questionnaires. 
Sample selection starts with choosing a community which is known to be
the origin of large emigration flows. Community selection is based on parallel
information from censuses, administrative records, or ethnographic research that
indicates that the place is a major source of emigrants. They were selected in
order to cover various levels of urbanization and socioeconomic conditions.
Therefore, sampled communities are not a random sample of each country’s geo-
graphical units (for a detailed explanation of the sampling scheme, see Massey
and Sana, 2003). However, the household sample is drawn randomly within
communities. After defining the community’s geographical boundaries, inter-
viewers construct a house sampling frame. The field supervisor selects a simple
random sample of approximately 100 to 200 households, assuming one house-
hold per house. This sampling design means that inferences cannot be made
about whole countries, but only for communities with high emigration rates.
Even though interviewers ask questions about all household members, most of
the questions about migration history refer to household heads. Additionally, in
order to find information about migrants who haven’t returned to their home
towns, interviewers collect names and addresses of migrants (generally, family
members) who are still in the U.S. or in other destinations (Costa Rica for
Nicaraguans, Argentina for Peruvians) at the time of the interview, using a
“snowball” technique. Finally, the supervisor contacts these migrants, draws a
subsample, and conducts the “ethnosurvey” with a modified version of the orig-
inal questionnaire. This non-random “snowball” sampling is based on addresses
given by relatives at origin towns, as well as on information gathered on-site dur-
ing the fieldwork at destination. It is not possible to draw a random sample of
migrants at destination because it is difficult to create a sampling frame of
migrants, given that 1) the size of the migrant population is large, 2) the destina-
tion is not necessarily concentrated in a single place, and 3) an important propor-
tion of migrants might not be located because they lack formal migration docu-
ments. Sampling weights of return migrants are based on the inverse of selection
probabilities in each community, while sampling weights for migrants living in
the country of destination are computed through indirect demographic tech-
niques that try to account for the size of each community’s population of
migrants who have not returned (LAMP, 2004; Massey et al, 1987; Massey and
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Sana, 2003; MMP, 2004). The average refusal rate per community is approxi-
mately 1% to 5%, including migrants who have not returned (Massey and Sana,
2003). Given the snowball sampling design for migrants who have not returned,
rejection rates tend to be low. 
In the MMP-LAMP projects, interviewers ask questions about all house-
hold members; however, most of the questions about migration history refer to
household heads. Therefore, the analyses refer to household heads. Additionally,
most information is retrospective, especially among return migrants. Therefore,
the information might be affected by recall bias. In order to minimize the effect
of recall bias, the analyses refer to migratory movements that occurred between
1984 and 2004; movements that happened earlier are excluded. This window
period coincides with economic crises that affected Latin America during the
1980s, the so-called “lost decade”. During this decade, Latin American govern-
ments implemented structural adjustment programs aimed at controlling the
effects of the economic downturn. This window period is also characterized by
the end of civil conflicts (in Guatemala and Nicaragua) and the development of
more democratic electoral processes (in Mexico, Nicaragua, and Guatemala).
However, most of the Peruvian elections that occurred during this period are the
ones in which Alberto Fujimori won the presidency and was reelected. The
Fujimori government can be considered an authoritarian regime. 
4.2   Methods
We test the association between election years and migration flows using
standard survival analysis techniques such as semi-parametric (Cox propor-
tional hazards models) and parametric (exponential, Weibull, log-normal, log-
logistic, and Gompertz) models. In the analyses of emigration, the main
dependent variable is the hazard of first migration to the U.S. (abroad in the
Peruvian case, and to Costa Rica in some of the Nicaraguan models). In the
analyses of return migration, the main dependent variable is the hazard of
returning to the country of origin during the first migration. 
Survival models, also known as event-history models, are comprised of
techniques in which the variable of interest is the time that passes from an ini-
tial point in time until the occurrence of certain event. Event history models
take into account the number of events or failures (numerator of a hazard rate)
and the time of exposure for the number of individuals at risk (denominator
of a hazard rate). These models are also known as hazards model because they
are represented as equations with hazards as the dependent variable. A hazard
is “the rate at which spells (being in one state for a certain time) are complet-
ed after duration t, given that they last until t” (Greene, 2003: 792). A hazard
function, thus, gives a continuous representation of a curve that describes
incidence rates through time (age, duration since diagnosis, etc.). 
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The rest of the notation is as described above.
The parametric models to be tested are exponential, Gompertz, Weibull,
log-logistic, and log-normal. The final parametric model is chosen based on the
smallest Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The exponential, Gompertz, and
Weibull models have a proportional hazards specification. This means that the
effect of a variable over the hazards remains constant over survival time. The
log-logistic and log-normal models have an accelerated failure time (AFT) spec-
ification. This specification means that the effect of a variable over the hazards
varies over time because the regression coefficients indicate changes in the
logged time of survival rather than in the hazard rates. This distinction is impor-
tant because in proportional hazard models, positive coefficients mean greater
hazards, while in AFT models, positive coefficients mean smaller hazards. 
The MMP and LAMP datasets are already arranged in person-years,
facilitating event history analyses. In all these models, time will be opera-
tionalized as age, and the main covariates are a set of dummy variables:
electoral year: 1=year during which elections are held, 0=other
before electoral year: 1=year before electoral year, 0=other
after electoral year: 1=year after electoral year, 0=other.
The baseline category is the set of years in between two elections. In the
models for return migration, migrants who have not returned and were contact-
ed by the “snowball” sampling scheme are the censored cases. The analysis
acknowledges that the sampling weights computed for non-return migrants
might affect point estimates of the hazards of migrating back. In the models
for first migration, censored cases refer to those who have not migrated yet.
Specification of the models will follow previous studies that have
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worked with the same datasets and the same dependent variables: emigration
and return migration (Massey et al., 1987; Lundquist and Massey, 2005;
Riosmena, 2006). The control variables in the model for emigration are: sex,
education (years of schooling), marital status (cohabiting or married), chil-
dren at time of migration, parents or siblings living at destination (except for
Nicaraguan flows to Costa Rica, given that there is no information about it),
owning land (number of properties), and owning business (number of busi-
nesses). There is also a set of binary variables for every selected community,
in order to control for differences in community size. 
The control variables in the model for return migration are: age, educa-
tion, marital status, other family members with migration experience, number
of children at the time of migration, logarithm of monthly wage at destination,
and status of entry to destination (documented or undocumented migrant).
Additionally, the models that control for the political business cycle have
three macroeconomic variables: the Exchange Rate of the origin country’s
currency with respect to the U.S. dollar, the Real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per Capita in current prices, and the Real GDP per Capita Relative to
the United States, in current prices. This information is taken from Penn
World Tables version 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009; Riosmena, 2006).
5.   RESULTS
The figures in Table 1 are used to describe the general dataset as well as the
population at risk for first out-migration. There are two separate columns for
Nicaragua; although most of the figures are roughly the same, the set of people
that are at risk of migrating to Costa Rica is different from the set at risk of
migrating to the U.S., given that both destinations are analyzed as competing
risks. The number of communities studied in the MMP/LAMP project varies by
country (Table 1). There are as many as 118 in Mexico (with a total of 17,747
household heads interviewed), and as few as 3 communities in Guatemala. Table
1 shows descriptive statistics for the confounding variables that are included in
the survival models. The characteristics of the interviewees -all household heads -
are very similar across countries, although there are several noteworthy differ-
ences. Mean age at interview is very similar; it ranges from 39 to 43 years.
However, mean age at migration varies across countries. The youngest mean age
at migration is observed among Nicaraguans migrating to Costa Rica, while the
oldest mean age at migration is observed among Peruvians (they emigrated from
Peru at 40 years of age, on average). In Nicaragua and in the Dominican
Republic, household heads are more likely to be women (30%). In contrast, in
Guatemala and Mexico, less than 17% of household heads are women. The
average education level is very similar across countries (between 6 to 8 years of
schooling), except in Peru where most household heads who were interviewed
had on average of 12 years of education. Given that communities were selected
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based on their high emigration rates, it is possible to argue that the communities
visited in the Peruvian LAMP Project are characterized by a relatively higher
educational level than the country as a whole the similar values between the
means and standard deviations of the variables at the end of the table suggest that
the number of siblings living in the U.S. (or abroad for Peruvians), the number of
properties, and the number of businesses owned by household heads are variables
with considerable positive skewedness: the mode in all of these variables is zero.
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics of the MMP/LAMP datasets used for the
analysis of first out-migration: Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Mexico,
Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Guatemala (1984-2004)
Notes: (1) For Nicaragua, the total sample is the same, but the total sample for first out-migration and
total person-years are different because migrating to Costa Rica or the U.S. is considered a competing
risk. Therefore, the risk set is different. (2) In Peru, the variables refer to relatives abroad rather than
relatives in the U.S. The Nicaraguan survey did not ask for relatives in Costa Rica.
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics of the MMP/LAMP datasets used for the
analysis of first return migration: Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Mexico,
Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Guatemala (1984-2004).
Notes: (1) For Nicaragua, the total sample is the same, but the total sample for first out-migration and
total person-years are different because migrating to Costa Rica or the U.S. is considered a competing
risk. Therefore, the risk set is different. (2) In Peru, the variables refer to relatives abroad rather than
relatives in the U.S. The Nicaraguan survey did not ask for relatives in Costa Rica. (3) The Nicaraguan
survey did not ask about documentation used for first migration to Costa Rica. (4) Nicaraguan wages
in Costa Rica are given in columns. The mean and standard deviation were converted to US$ based on
the exchange rate of the year of return.
table. Among Mexicans and Guatemalans, less than 8% of migrants exposed
to the risk of moving back to their homeland are women, but among Peruvians,
30% of them are women. Again Peruvians are, on average, better educated
than the rest of the migrants. Most of migrants are married (proportions over
50%), except Nicaraguans in Costa Rica( only 30% of them are married). It is
also noteworthy that most migrants, except for Peruvians and Costa Ricans
entered the U.S. without proper legal documents.
The article begins with the analysis of first out-migration, using Cox pro-
portional hazard models (Table 3). These models control for confounding
effects, but do not include macroeconomic indicators as covariates. There is a
first group of origin countries where the electoral cycle reduces the likelihood of
emigrating. According to these models, the risk of emigrating is lower during an
electoral year and the year after in the Nicaraguan flows towards the U.S. and
Costa Rica. The risk is also lower in the previous year before the elections in the
flow from Nicaragua to Costa Rica, as well as in the flows from Peru and
Mexico. In the other group of countries, the hazards of out-migrating are greater
during the election years. This happens in the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica,
and Guatemala. However, in the Dominican Republic, the hazards of emigrating
are lower during the year before the elections. This suggests that the flows in the
Dominican Republic might follow a similar pattern as the first group, but with a
different timing. A proportional hazards test is performed for each regression in
order to assess one of the main assumptions of the Cox regression and several
parametric regression models: Gompertz, exponential, and Weibull (Table 4).
The assumption holds for all the studied flows.
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Table 3 – Hazard ratios of first out-migration for dichotomous variables of
electoral year, year before elections, and year after elections, from Cox 
proportional hazards model (Controlling for age, sex, education, current 
number of children, number of children ever born, marital status, relatives with
migration history, number of properties, and number of businesses)
Source: MMP and LAMP datasets.
Note: *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001
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The parametric models confirm what is observed from the Cox regression
analyses (Table 5). The first 6 flows are modeled with a Gompertz distribution,
while the last two (the flows from the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua to
the U.S.) are modeled with a log-logistic regression. In the first 6 models, neg-
ative coefficients imply smaller emigration risks, while in the last two, nega-
tive coefficients indicate a lower time to emigrate (hence, greater hazards of
out-migration). 
Table 4 – Rho statistic and associated probability of proportionality 
test for electoral period binary variables in Cox regression for first 
out-migration, for each country
Source: MMP and LAMP datasets.
Table 5 – Survival regression coefficients (and hazard ratios in parentheses
underneath when proper to the model) of first out-migration for dichotomous
variables of electoral year, year before elections, and year after elections, 
from parametric hazards model with contextual economic variables and 
without them (Controlling for age, sex, education, current number 
of children, number of children ever born, marital status, relatives with 
migration history, number of properties, and number of businesses)
...Cont’d...
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The right-hand panel of Table 5 represents the models augmented with
controls for the political business cycle, operationalized with the GDP per
capita, the GDP per capita relative to the U.S. GDP per capita, and the
exchange rate of each origin country’s currency with respect to the U.S. dol-
lar. In most of the countries, the inclusion of these variables does not change
the direction of the coefficients. In some of them - the flow from Nicaragua
to Costa Rica and the flow from the Dominican Republic to the U.S. -, this
addition slightly softens the regression coefficient for the election year; this
implies that the electoral cycle in these flows still exists, but it is partially
accounted for by the political business cycle.
The only flow that is modified after including the macroeconomic indi-
cators in the equation is the Mexican flow. According to the original equation,
Mexicans were less likely to emigrate during the years before and after an
election while the coefficient for the electoral year was not significantly dif-
ferent to zero. However, after controlling for the political business cycle, the
coefficients for the year before elections and for the electoral year are posi-
tive and statistically significant. This implies that, after controlling for the
economic context, there are apparent political motivations for emigrating dur-
ing this period.
Table 5 – Cont’d
Source: MMP and LAMP datasets.
Note: *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.0001, ***
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The electoral cycle of return migration seems different than that
observed for first out-migration. Based on hazard ratios from Cox regres-
sions, there appears to be 4 groups of countries (Table 6). In the first group
(Dominican Republic and Nicaragua to the U.S.), people are more likely to
migrate back to their countries of origin during the elections period. In Peru
(a second one-member group), people are more likely to return during the
years before and after the elections, but are less likely to do so during the elec-
tion year. This pattern is difficult to explain. In a third group of flows (Costa
Rica and Mexico to the U.S., and Nicaragua to Costa Rica), return migration
is less likely during at least one of the electoral period years. Finally, in
Guatemala, there is no significant effect of the electoral period over the haz-
ards of return migration. The proportional hazards assumption holds for all
the Cox models (Table 7).
The parametric models confirm again the Cox regression results (Table
8). A log-logistic regression and a log-normal regression are adjusted to the
Dominican and Guatemalan data, respectively. Given that these are AFT
specifications, negative coefficients mean greater likelihood of returning.
The flow from Nicaragua to the U.S. is modeled with a Weibull regression,
Table 6 – Hazard ratios of first return migration for dichotomous 
variables of electoral year, year before elections, and year after elections, 
from Cox proportional hazards model (Controlling for age, sex, education, 
current number of children, number of children ever born, marital 
status, relatives with migration history, number of properties, number 
of businesses, natural logarithm of wage, and legal status of entry 
into destination)
Source: MMP and LAMP datasets.
Note: *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001
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while the remaining four flows are modeled with a Gompertz regression. The
Gompertz and Weibull models assume proportional hazards. Therefore, a
negative coefficient is translated into a smaller hazard ratio, and lower haz-
ards of migrating back. 
The inclusion of macroeconomic variables in the models changes the
coefficients of the electoral period variables, except in Mexico and the
Table 7 – Rho statistic and associated probability of proportionality test 
for electoral period binary variables in Cox regression for first return 
migration, for each country
Source: MMP and LAMP datasets.
Note: *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001
Table 8 – Survival regression coefficients (and hazard ratios in parentheses
underneath when proper to the model) of first return migration 
for dichotomous variables of electoral year, year before elections, and 
year after elections, from parametric hazards model with contextual 
economic variables and without them (Controlling for age, sex, education, 
current number of children, number of children ever born, marital status, 
relatives with migration history, number of properties, number 





Nicaraguan flows towards Costa Rica. In Peru, there was a greater likelihood
of returning the year after elections, but with the macroeconomic controls, the
likelihood of returning is now smaller. In the case of the Costa Rican flows,
there is no significant effect of the electoral period years on return migration
in the original equation, but in the equation that accounts for the political busi-
ness cycle, the hazards of migrating back are lower during an election year. A
similar pattern is observed with the log-normal regression for Guatemala. The
coefficients for the electoral period years tend to be significant after control-
ling for the business political cycle in the Nicaraguan flows towards the U.S.,
while the opposite happens in the regression for Dominicans. 
These results suggest that the political business cycle is confounded with
the electoral cycle in the process of return migration. If the state of the econo-
my is accounted for, elections motivate Nicaraguans in the U.S. to return to
their home country, but discourage Guatemalans, Costa Ricans, and Peruvians
to do so. On the contrary, the state of the economy seems to account for the
negative return flows of Mexicans and the positive return flows of Dominicans
during the electoral period.
Table 8 – Cont’d
Source: MMP and LAMP datasets.
Note: *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001
THE ELECTORAL CYCLE OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION FLOWS FROM LATIN AMERICA
63
6.   CONCLUSIONS
The empirical evidence drawn from the analysis suggests that there is a
political cycle in either emigration or return migration flows in 6 Latin
American countries. If elections were to generate expectations of a better eco-
nomic or political situation in the near future, the electoral cycle would have
to decrease the likelihood of emigrating and would have to increase the like-
lihood of return migration. The only flows showing this pattern clearly are the
flows from Nicaragua (Table 9). Nicaraguans are significantly less likely to
out-migrate during the elections year. They are more likely to migrate back
from Costa Rica during the whole three-year electoral period, but back from
the U.S only during the year before elections. The hazards are lower in the
year after elections. The flows from Peru also show a similar pattern after
controlling for macroeconomic indicators. Peruvians are significantly less
likely to emigrate and more likely to return during the pre-electoral year.
However, they are less likely to migrate back during the year of elections and
the year after. In Mexico, the expected direction of the electoral cycle is
observed only for return migration in the equations that control for the polit-
ical business cycle. Mexicans are more likely to out-migrate during the elec-
toral and pre-electoral years, although they are less likely to do so the year
after elections. In Guatemala and Costa Rica the effects have the opposite
direction to the expected pattern. 
Table 9 – Summary of the effect of the electoral cycle on migration hazards




The exceptional case of Costa Rica might be due to its political system.
Among the 6 Latin American countries that were studied, Costa Rica has the
most stable democratic regime with economic policies that have been very
uniform since 1986. Therefore, the expectation of having a drastic change in
socio-economic policies after an election might be less likely than in the other
countries. These other countries have recently experienced military dictator-
ships (Nicaragua) or authoritarian democratic governments (Mexico, Peru,
Dominican Republic). Given that the analyses performed in this article refer
to the periods after authoritarian administrations (except in Peru), citizens’
expectations of change after an election are supposed to be great (Fornos et
al., 2004; Lopez-Pintor, 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). On the con-
trary, the absence of an authoritarian regime in Costa Rica might explain the
absence of an electoral cycle effect. However, this explanation does not apply
to Guatemala, whose pattern was similar to Costa Rica. Guatemala experi-
enced the end of a civil war and political unrest during the same time period.
Verification of an electoral cycle in Peru and Nicaragua is somehow
Table 9 – Cont’d
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expected given that there are migration processes to neighboring countries:
Nicaragua towards Costa Rica and Peru towards Chile and Argentina. The
costs and legal barriers of emigrating and returning to their home countries
are less stringent than if the U.S. or Europe were the destination. This result
conveys that electoral cycles might be more frequent in South-South migra-
tion flows. If this is true and the assumption that people in countries that have
recent transitions to democracy have greater expectations from elections, then
it might be possible to observe electoral cycles from other Latin American
countries with large emigration flows towards neighboring countries:
Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay, or the migration processes of
Guatemalans going to Belize. 
The expected pattern observed in the flows from Mexico and Nicaragua
to the U.S. indicates that there can still be an electoral cycle despite the typi-
cal costs of Latin American migration processes to the U.S. (distance, border
restrictions). This electoral cycle cannot be generalized, since the effect was
different among Dominicans, Guatemalans and Costa Ricans. It is difficult to
explain what Mexicans (the largest emigrant community in the U.S.) have in
common with Nicaraguans and how they differ with the other Latin
Americans who are studied in the article. More research is needed to under-
stand whether there are other covariates that explain this similarity, aside from
the covariates included in the models: family in the U.S., marital status, chil-
dren, properties and business at home countries, legal migratory status in the
U.S., or wage levels (the latter in the case of the return migration models).
Another goal of this article was to analyze whether the existence of an
electoral cycle could be explained by the political business cycle. The only
emigration flow that was completely modified by the inclusion of macroeco-
nomic variables in the model was the Mexican flow. This means that
Mexicans are less likely to emigrate to the U.S. during the electoral period
than during other times. Nevertheless, if the effect of the state of the country’s
economy is taken into account in the model, Mexicans are more likely to
migrate during the election year and the year before. The other flows were not
affected by the inclusion of macroeconomic variables in the model. This sug-
gests that the electoral cycle in first out-migration is not explained by higher
economic output during the electoral period, which is typical of developing
countries (Ames, 1987; Block, 2002; Drazen, 2000; Gonzalez, 2002;
Schuknecht, 1996). If the electoral cycle is not explained by the political busi-
ness cycle, then it is possible that this electoral pattern might be indicating
long-term economic expectations (rather than the short-term expectations of
the political business cycle) or non-economic expectations, such as political
stability (Lam, 2002). 
The macroeconomic performance indicators do modify the relationship
between the electoral years and return migration in all of the countries, except
in Nicaragua. After controlling for these covariates, emigrants are less likely
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to return during the electoral period, especially during the years after elec-
tions. Only in the Dominican Republic are hazard regression coefficients no
longer significant after controlling for the macroeconomic variables.
Therefore, it appears that the electoral cycle in return migration does reflect
migrants’ economic expectations in most of the studied countries. 
The article analyzes a little studied topic: the relationship between elec-
tion years and migration flows in Latin America. The author finds a statisti-
cal relationship. However, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of
the study. The analyses are performed using the MMP and LAMP datasets and
the analyses share the advantages and limitations of these datasets. They com-
prise some of the richest information that can be found about migration from
Latin America. Nevertheless, data refer only to migration processes among
household heads hence inference can only be made to migration flows of
household heads. Additionally, most information about migration behavior is
collected from answers to retrospective questions, rather than from prospec-
tive longitudinal data. The towns visited by the MMP/LAMP projects are not
a representative sample of the countries’ towns. The towns are selected based
on previous knowledge about their status as major focal points of out migra-
tion; the houses in the sample are selected randomly from all the entire pop-
ulation of houses in the towns. Therefore, inferences can only be made to peo-
ple living in this major focal points of outmigration and not to everyone liv-
ing in these countries..
The selection of the window period also might have affected the results.
The window period was chosen with the specific aim of reducing the effect of
recall bias. However, the 1984-2004 period partially overlaps with the 1980s
decade, a period characterized by economic crises in several Latin American
countries. The article cannot clearly control for the effect of the economic
crises, although the macroeconomic variables used to operationalize the polit-
ical business cycle are also correlated with the effects of the economic down-
turns.
A more thorough analysis of the electoral cycle should include political
variables such as popular perception about democracy and political parties,
voting behavior, or political participation. The MMP/LAMP datasets do not
contain this kind of information given that the main goal of the projects is to
explore migration patterns rather than political information. It would be inter-
esting to collect such information in future versions of the MMP/LAMP eth-
nosurveys.
Despite the limitations, the article raises important questions about non-
economic motivations for migrating. More research is needed to study the kinds
of motivations that might explain the electoral cycle observed in the article’s
analyses. Understanding the presence of cycles in migration trends might be
useful for policy makers in both countries of origin and destination because
cycles imply that emigration flows are not necessarily constant over time.
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